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THE USE OF OFFSHORE TAX HAVENS
FOR THE PURPOSE OF CRIMINALLY
EVADING INCOME TAXES
I. INTRODUCTION*
A complicated set of multinational, and intergovernmental
problems exist that American law enforcement agencies must overcome
to prevent the use of offshore tax havens to shield criminal activity or
criminal tax evasion. These agencies encounter a variety of difficulties
in analyzing transactions involving offshore tax havens. The problem is
not one of substantive law; it is largely informational. The simple prohi-
bition of section 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code, which renders it a
felony for anyone willfully to evade a tax imposed by the United States
Government, is sufficient and comprehensive statutory authority to deal
with any tax evasion problem, including one involving offshore tax
havens. By creating a veil of secrecy, however, taxpayers can illegally
manipulate transactions involving offshore tax havens to evade United
States tax liability. This paper examines offshore tax havens, how tax-
payers may manipulate them, how the United States enforcement agen-
cies have attempted to deal with this problem, and proposes some
solutions to the offshore tax haven problem.
The extraterritorial effect of United States tax laws defines the con-
ceptual framework of the problem of criminal tax evasion involving the
use of offshore tax havens. In enacting section 61 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code, Congress exerted a worldwide taxing jurisdiction. Ex&ept as
otherwise provided in the Code, gross income is defined as all income
from whatever source derived.1 Unlike many other nations; the United
States taxes the income of its residents regardless of where it was
* I would like to thank Mssrs. Philmore H. Friedman, David E. Greene and John P.
Goodman of Pfizer, Inc.; Mr. Richard A. Gordon, International Tax Counsel for the Joint
Committee on Taxation; and Professors Leonard J. Workman and Philip F. Postlewaite who
read and commented on this paper at various stages. Of course, all mistakes and omissions
are entirely my own.
I I.R.C. § 61 (1981). The legislative history to the 1954 Internal Revenue Code reiterates
the proposition that statutory gross income is "all inclusive." H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. A18 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 168 (1954). e also Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426,431 (1955), wherein gross
income is defined as "accessions to wealth, clearly realized, over which the taxpayers have
complete dominion."
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earned.2 The Internal Revenue Service is responsible for enforc-
ing the tax laws; it has the power within the United States to issue sum-
monses to compel the production of records.3 Intergovernmental con-
flicts and multinational business entities make extraterritorial
enforcement of the tax laws a more difficult task. Additionally, bank
secrecy laws, numbered bank accounts and a host of other barriers to the
gathering of information concerning the income that American taxpay-
ers earn or send abroad can effectively impair even the most efficient
auditor.
The actual magnitude of illegal use of offshore tax havens is uncer-
tain because estimates of the amount of American money flowing
through offshore tax havens and serving illegal purposes, such as the
laundering of narcotics money, are unreliable.4 Authorities even disa-
gree on whether most illegal money is laundered offshore or within the
United States.5 Estimates indicate that the amount of illegal money ex-
ported to the Caribbean tax havens alone runs in excess of fifty billion
dollars annually.6
Tax havens are not only used to further illegal purposes; there are
bona fide opportunities for United States taxpayers to invest in offshore
tax havens. In many instances, the tax consequences of tax haven trans-
actions reflect clear congressional intent to limit the scope of the United
States taxing jurisdiction.7 Additionally, courts have consistently recog-
nized the taxpayers' right to minimize their tax liability to the full ex-
2 See, e.g., Laws of the Republic of Zambia, Income Tax, Ch. 668 § 14(1) (1972),
whereby a person is taxable on income from sources within or deemed to be within the Re-
public and on interest and dividends from sources outside the Republic.
3 I.R.C. § 7602 (1981).
4 The Ue of Ojihore Ta Haven for the Purpose of Evading Income Tares. Hearings Boefre theSubcommittee on Oversight of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Ofshore Ta Haven Hearings].
5 Illegal Narcotics Profits: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Sen-
ate Committee on GovernmentalAfairs, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 474 (1979) (Exhibit No. 33, Offshore
Banking: Issues With Respect to Criminal Use, Submitted to the Ford Foundation, Nov.
1979, by Richard Blum and John Kaplan) [hereinafter cited as Illegal Narcotics Prof&r Hear-
ings]. Surprisingly, offshore bankers and Internal Revenue Service agents independently of-
fered Professor Blum the same estimate of about $25 billion transiting the Bahamas annually.
Id. at n.6.
6 Id.
7 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, TAX HAVENS AND THEIR USE
BY UNITED STATES TAXPAYERS - AN OVERVIEW, 5 (1981) [hereinafter cited as TAX
HAVENS].
Most large commercial banks, for example, maintain branch offices in the Bahamas and
the Cayman Islands primarily to participate free of United States control in the Eurodollar
market. These branches, which are'subject to the general supervisory authority of American
regulatory agencies, need not comply with the reserve requirements of the Federal Reserve
Board. Thus it may be more profitable to operate offshore, where a bank is unrestricted as to
amount of deposit money that it can loan or invest. Ofhore Tax Haven Hearings, supra note 4,
at 359.
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tent that they are permitted by law, including opportunities afforded by
offshore tax havens. As Judge Learned Hand said;
[A] transaction, otherwise within the tax law, does not lose its immunity,
because it is actuated by a desire to avoid . .. taxation. Any one may
arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound
to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a
patriotic duty duty to increase one's taxes.8
Often the distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion in the
use of foreign tax havens is imprecise because the law governing the
transactions is unclear and the requisite data is incomplete. Tax avoid-
ance involves the arranging of a taxpayer's affairs to take advantage of
that which the law allows.9 In the past, taxpayers have used foreign
entities to achieve tax results that were not obtainable in similar transac-
tions with domestic entities.10 Over the years, Congress has attempted
to "plug" certain of these "loopholes.""
Tax evasion, on the other hand, involves acts intended to misrepre-
sent or to conceal facts in an effort to escape lawful tax liability.' 2 In a
criminal tax evasion case, the government must prove each element of
8 Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), a'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
9 The taxpayer has the burden of proving all items claims on his return in a civil case.
T.C. Rule 142. See I.R.C. § 7453 (1981).
10 Offhore Tax Haven Heangs, supira note 4, at 175 (testimony of Jerome Kurtz, Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue).
11 For example, prior to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
455, 90 Stat. 1520, a taxpayer could take advantage of a foreign situs trust to eliminate or to
defer significant amounts of United States taxes. See Kanter, The Foreign T rt - A 'One World'
Concept of Tax Planning, 22 MAJOR TAX PLANNING 467, 469 (1970). In general, one could
structure a trust agreement such that the undistributed income was not taxable to the trust
because of the unique tax classifications for foreign trusts. One could avoid the progressive
rate structure of the tax system if a grantor created a trust to accumulate income taxed at low
rates. The trust in turn would distribute the income at a future date with the beneficiary
paying little or no tax. This result occurs because the trust rather than the grantor or the
beneficiary is taxed on the accumulated income. The Tax Reform Act's throwback rule pre-
vents this result by taxing beneficiaries on accumulated distributions in the year that they
received such distributions. Upon distribution of the trust's accumulated income, the benefi-
ciary would be subject to the throwback provisions of I.R.C. § 666.
Not all tax savings are lost, however, because all distributions made by the trust retain
the same character of income in the hands of the beneficiary. Thus long term capital gain
characterization would not change and the ensuing tax savings would take the form of a
deferral of tax liability. Id. at 469, 470.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 further closed this loophole by the enactment of I.R.C.
§ 679 which limits the classification of a trust as a foreign situs trust. Under § 679, which
draws on the C105rd trust rules established in Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940), if a
United States grantor creates a foreign trust, the grantor becomes taxable on all items of
income attributable to the portion of the trust transferred by the grantor to the trust. Zim-
merman, Usingforeign trusts in post-1976petio" What possibilities remain?, 47 J. TAX'N 12 (1977).
This is not to say that the Tax Reform Act of 1976 has eliminated the trust instrument as a
tax planning device. See Kanter, Grantor Ints as Sub Sshareholders: New vistasforfplanning opened
by TRA of 1976, 46 J. TAX'N 130 (1977).
12 I.R.C. § 7201 (1981) renders it a felony punishable by up to a $10,000 fine or five years
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the offense, including intent, some affirmative act to evade tax on the
part of the taxpayer and an understatement of tax liability.' 3 Persons
intent on evading taxes can use tax havens either to hide income or as
part of a complex scheme intended to conceal the true nature of a trans-
action. In the former instance, the government may be unable to prove
either the amount of money or property held in an account. In the lat-
ter case, the taxpayer intends to thwart criminal prosecution both by
obfuscating the true nature of the transaction and by limiting the gov-
ernment's access to information needed to sustain its burden of proof.14
II. NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF TAx HAVENS
Commentators have employed both an objective and a subjective
approach in determining which nations are tax havens. Under the ob-
jective approach, a tax haven is any nation which has no tax or a low
rate of tax on all or certain categories of income and which offers a
certain level of banking or commercial secrecy.15 Under the subjective
approach, a reputation test is employed. A country is a tax haven if it
promotes itself as one, and those who specialize in international tax
planning consider it to be one. 16
The most important characteristic of a tax haven is that it imposes
little or no tax on all or certain categories of income, or it imposes a rate
of tax which is low relative to the taxes imposed by the taxpayer's home
country.' 7 In some situations, the low or nonexistent tax rates are part
of a nation's policy to attract banking, trust or corporate business. In
other situations, the havens are small, undeveloped nations whose resi-
in prison or both for any person who willfully attempts to evade or to defeat any taxes
imposed.
13 Offihore Tax Haven Hearings, supra note 4, at 176 (testimony of Jerome Kurtz, Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue).
'4 Id.
15 TAx HAVENS, supra note 7, at 14. If this definition is applied literally, it would encom-
pass many nations that are not generally considered tax havens, including the United States.
The United States does not tax interest on bank deposits of nonresident aliens if such interest
is not effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States.
I.R.C. § 861(a)(1)(A) (1981). See Rev. Rul. 75-449, 1975-2 C.B. 285 for a definition of
deposits.
16 Most publications identifying jurisdictions as tax havens specify nearly all of the same
nations, such as the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, Singapore, Turkey, Caicos, Hong Kong,
the Hebrides, the Jerseys/Guernseys. See Rhoades, Tax Havens: What They Are; Where Thq Are;
and How You Can Use Them EFectively, 3 TAX'N FOR LAWS. 68, 71 (1974). See genral Ilegal
Narcotics Profd s Hearings, supra note 5, at 480-90.
17 TAX HAVENS, supra note 7, at 14, 15. Many nations having tax haven characteristics
are also frequently bases for minimizing taxation on various types of perfectly legal income
and activities. These same nations have created a veil of secrecy through bank secrecy laws
which provide the anonymity sought by persons evading tax laws. One should take care to
avoid combining and confusing legitimate uses of tax havens with illegitimate activities, such
as laundering money.
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dents are poor. A poor population with a minimal tax base makes the
imposition of an income tax unfeasible.18 Instead of an income tax, the
country will establish a license or fee system on items such as bank
licenses and commercial charters to generate revenues. 19
Tax havens must afford some level of commercial secrecy to bank-
ing transactions in order to permit taxpayers to perpetrate tax evasion
schemes. 20 Banking secrecy has its origins in the common law of Great
Britian. Common law secrecy derives from an implied contract between
a banker and his client that the banker will treat his customer's affairs as
confidential. 21 Most of the tax haven jurisdictions which were once
British colonies have statutorily affirmed and enhanced the common
law rules regarding secrecy. A tax haven will frequently strengthen its
bank secrecy laws to improve its competitive posture vis-a-vis other tax
havens.22
Most nations, including non-tax havens, afford bank clientele some
level of secrecy. At the same time, however, many nations will not pro-
tect information from a legitimate inquiry of a foreign government, par-
ticularly when the inquiry is made under terms of a treaty.23 Most
major tax havens, on the other hand, will not breach their wall of se-
crecy even when a major violation of another nation's laws may be in-
volved. 24 The crucial distinction is between those nations which enact
unreasonably restrictive rules of bank secrecy which tend to facilitate
18 Id. at 15.
19 See, e.g., Statute Iw of the Bahama Islands, Ch. 280 (1965) imposing fees on certain
activities.
20 A person also can take advantage of banking secrecy laws for noncriminal purposes,
such as hiding money from one's spouse.
21 Tournier v. National Provincial and Union Bank of England, 1 KB. 461 (1924).
22 Tax havens also react to other outside factors affecting their ability to function. In
United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976), the Fifth
Circuit directed a Cayman Islands resident to give testimony concerning bank information
before a United States grand jury, even though he would be subject to criminal penalties in
the Cayman Islands because his testimony would violate their banking secrecy laws. The
Caymans reacted to this decision by enacting the Confidential Relationships (Preservation)
Law (Law 16 of 1976). Section 4(b) made it a crime punishable by a $5,000 fine and a two
year prison sentence for an individual to obtain willfully or to attempt to obtain confidential
information to which he is not entitled.
23 Even Switzerland, the world's principal bank secrecy jurisdiction, has agreed to ex-
change banking information with other nations under appropriate circumstances. Switzer-
land will exchange information with the United States under a treaty arrangement in order
to carry out the provisions of the treaty or to prevent fraud and the like in relation to the
taxes which are the subject of the treaty. Convention between the United States of America
and the Swiss Confederation for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on
Income, May 25, 1951, United States - Switzerland, Art. XVI(1), 2 U.S.T. 1751, 1760,
T.I.A.S. No. 2316. In practice, Switzerland has been reluctant to give out information. See
inf/a text accompanying notes 137-42.
24 Most tax havens will refuse to divulge certain information even upon request and will
state that they are not empowered to give out such information under their municipal law.
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international tax evasion and other crimes, and those nations which pay
homage to the protection of individual privacy but still permit legiti-
mate inquiry under appropriate circumstances.25
Financial institutions frequently assume a dominant role in the tax
haven's trade and commerce. One method of testing the importance of
banking to an economy is to examine the relationship of foreign assets in
the country's banks to that country's foreign trade. Excess foreign assets
are the amounts which exceed the ratio of worldwide foreign assets of
deposit banks to worldwide foreign trade. Banks in the Bahamas, for
example, held $95.2 billion of foreign assets in 1978. Based on the
worldwide average of deposits to world trade, the Bahamas needed only
$1.8 billion to finance its foreign trade. The $93.4 billion difference rep-
resents excess international assets and indicates the attractiveness of the
Bahamas as a tax haven.26
One of the reasons that tax havens can attract bank deposits is that
they frequently do not impose currency controls or similar restrictions
on foreign nationals.2 7 Nonresidents are, however, subject to currency
controls on local currency. Exchange controls will not apply to foreign
nationals as long as they are dealing in the currency of other jurisdic-
tions and are not engaging in business in the tax haven.28
Finally, most tax havens promote policies that aggressively seek
financial business because banks, trust companies and other financial
institutions are a stable source of revenue for the tax haven.29 For exam-
ple, in 1964 the Cayman Islands had only one or two banks and virtu-
ally no offshore or nonresident business. By December 31, 1977, this
nation with a population of only 14,000 had 237 banks and trust compa-
See, e.g., An Act to regulate Banking Business and Trust Companies within the Colony and
other matters related thereto. (Bahamas, No. 64 of 1965).
25 TAx HAVENS, supra note 7, at 16-17. This distinction reflects an American bias. A
Swiss national might argue that Swiss law assigns a higher priority to the sanctity of the
individual and his personal rights than does United States law. Privacy in Switzerland is a
statutorily enforceable right by virtue of Article 28 of the Civil Code and Articles 41 and 49 of
the Code of Obligation. See Meier, Banking Secreg in Swiss and International Taxation, 7 INT'L
LAw. 16, 17 (1973). The Swiss view of privacy can be contrasted with the guarantees of
privacy expounded by the United States Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 484 (1965). The Court stated that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penum-
bras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that create zones of privacy.
26 TAX HAVENS, supra note 7, at 17. The excess foreign assets for nine tax haven jurisdic-
tions increased sixteenfold for the period from 1970 to 1978 and during this same period,
foreign assets grew from 12.5% to 29.1% of all foreign assets held worldwide. Id. at 17-18.
27 Oihore Tar Haven Heaings, sura note 4, at 174.
28 TAx HAVENS, sura note 7, at 19.
29 Id. Modem communications are also necessary to support the banking industry and
therefore, most tax havens have excellent communications facilities, particularly telephone
and telex services. The Cayman Islands, for example, advertises that it has more telex ma-
chines per capita than any place on earth. Ofshore Tax Haven Hearings, supra note 4, at 33.
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nies and 8,158 registered companies. 30
III. How TAX HAVENS ARE MANIPULATED
The ways in which taxpayers can take advantage of the opportuni-
ties afforded by tax havens and secret foreign bank accounts to evade
income taxes are almost as numerous as the ways of earning money.
3 1
This section illustrates diagramatically some of the more common meth-
ods in which tax havens are used to perpetrate illegal tax evasion
schemes.32 Figure 1 illustrates an American business operation which is
owned by American citizens A through E. The business makes pay-
ments to a foreign corporation and deducts these payments as business




Domestic Side Foreign Side






An audit might disclose that these business expenses are being paid
to a foreign corporation. The American business may bury questionable
deductions within the cost of goods sold account and thus these deduc-
tions might not be apparent on the face of the return. If questioned on
the deductibility of these expenses, the taxpayers would claim that the
30 Ofihore Tax Haven Hearings, supra note 4, at 15.
31 Legal and Economic Impact of Foreign Banking Procedures on the United States: Hearings before
the House Committee on Banking and Currenv, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1968) (statement of Robert
Morganthau, United States District Attorney, S.D.N.Y) [hereinafter cited as Banking
Hearings].
32 This section, including the diagrams, is largely adapted from the testimony of Ross
Macbeth, staff member of the Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division, Ofshore Tax Haven
Hearings, supra note 4, at 7-11.
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domestic and foreign entities are not related33 and support the expenses
with cancelled checks paid to the foreign enterprise. Other documents
such as receipts supporting the payments also might ensure that the ex-
penses are not questioned.
The auditor may also have trouble detecting items on the foreign
side of the transaction. In Figure 2, the American business is paying
phony business expenses to a foreign corporation which retains approxi-
mately ten percent of the funds.
FIGURE 2
TAX HAVEN SCHEMES






CO PO RATIO  PARCORPOR l 
The foreign corporation passes on the balance of the funds to another
foreign organization, but the auditor would not find this part of the
transaction within the records of the taxpayers. The records supporting
this part of the transaction may not even be located in this country.
The auditor also would not discover the channelling of unreported
profits to an account in a tax haven on the tax returns or in the books
and records of the American business. If the business generates a signifi-
cant amount of cash, it could send skimmed receipts offshore. Skim-
ming is one of the simplest and most common illegal uses of offshore tax
havens.34 The taxpayer could also set up a service contract whereby he
claims that the offshore entity is performing services for the taxpayer's
33 I.R.C. § 482 (1981) empowers the Commissioner in the case of two related organiza-
tions to "distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances
between. . . such organizations, . . . if he determines that such distribution, apportionment,
or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly reflect the income of
any such organizations. . ....
34 Banking Hearings, supra note 31, at 15.
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FIGURE 3
TAx HAVEN SCHEMES
Domestic Side Foreign Side
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American business. In reality, the United States business performed the
services while fraudulently claiming a deduction for the payment to the
offshore entity. The auditor would not discover any of these transac-
tions because he does not have access to the records of the offshore
entity.
As Figure 3 indicates, the foreign operation is in fact owned by for-
eign trusts, the beneficiaries of which are taxpayers A through E or their
families. An auditor would not know of the existence of the trusts, and
thhs he could not connect the taxpayers with the offshore funds.
Even though the money is theoretically offshore, the bank accounts
for all these entities may be located in the United States. If the auditors
can find these accounts, then a paper trail exists which can connect the
taxpayers to the funds. Yet even in cases where the government can
successfully identify the relationship between the taxpayers and the off-
shore transactions, government agents must spend thousands of hours
piecing together complex and seemingly unrelated transactions. The
government may not even be able to prosecute in situations where it has
complete information on the criminal activity because foreign bankers
may refuse to furnish witnesses competent to introduce bank documents
into evidence.35
In most instances, however, the auditor will never find out what
happened to the funds. The money may actually leave the United
States and subsequently return through another transaction. If the au-
ditor cannot detect the critical transaction of the flow of funds from the










offshore entity to the United States, the taxpayer has successfully "laun-
dered" his funds. Figure 4 illustrates some of the more common meth-
ods of repatriating funds.
Taxpayer A repatriates the funds by instructing his trust to invest
in United States securities. The taxpayer would structure the transac-
tion through an intermediary trust so that the investing entity is organ-
ized under the laws of a nation with which the United States has a
treaty eliminating the withholding tax.36 In this way he would avoid
the thirty percent withholding tax on the interest and dividends paid by
the securities.3 7
Taxpayer B engages in an annuity transaction in United States se-
curities with his trust whereby he sells appreciated securities to the trust
36 For example, The Netherlands Antilles is a tax haven entity which has a tax treaty
exempting interest and dividends from withholding taxes. See Protocol Supplementing the
Convention between the United States of America and the Kingdom of The Netherlands
with Respect to Taxes on Income and Certain Other Taxes for the Purpose of Facilitating
Extension to The Netherlands Antilles, June 15, 1955, United States-The Netherlands, 6
U.S.T. 3696, T.I.A.S. No. 3366.
37 I.R.C. § 871(a)(1) (1981).
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in return for an annuity with a carryover basis.38 When the trust sells
the appreciated securities, there is no immediate taxable gain because it
is realized by an offshore entity that is not subject to tax in the United
States.39
Taxpayer C has a different approach to repatriation; he invests in
improved real estate. If the activity is classified as an investment as op-
posed to a trade or business, C proceeds through a holding company
incorporated in a tax haven (treaty) nation, such as The Netherlands
Antilles, that has a treaty provision providing for a year-by-year election
to net income against expenses as if the investment was a trade or busi-
ness.4" When he sells the real estate, he revokes the election so that he is
not subject to tax in the United States in the year of the sale. Therefore,
the capital gain would be offshore and untaxed.4 1
Taxpayer D's trust invests in foreign real estate, perhaps a condo-
minium on the beach in the Bahamas where D takes his vacations.
Taxpayer E wants to realize his investment in cash while avoiding a
repatriation problem. He indirectly obtains a "loan" from the bank in
the tax haven which is the trustee of his trust. The bank would loan the
38 I.R.C. § 72(c) (1981).
39 This transaction would merely defer the reported gain. Taxpayer B would still have to
recognize gain from the annuity transaction as he receives money, subject to the installment
sales provisions of I.R.C. § 453 (1981).
40 Many of the United States tax treaties permit a foreigner who is not engaged in a
United States trade or business to elect to have his real estate income taxed as if it were
income derived from a trade or business. Thus taxpayer C could annually net his business
income from the real estate against his expenses. C would then have the option of revoking
that election in the year in which the real estate is sold. Thus the gain would not be subject to
tax in the United States in the year of the sale. See, e.g., Protocol modifying and supplement-
ing the Extension to The Netherlands Antilles of the Convention between the United States
of America and the Kingdom of The Netherlands for the avoidance of double taxation and
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and certain other taxes of April
29, 1948, United States-The Netherlarids, 15 U.S.T. 1900, T.I.A.S. No. 5665. For a descrip-
tion of the principal methods of circumventing the adverse consequences of foreign real estate
transactions prior to the passage of I.R.C. § 879 (1981), see P. POSTLEWArTE, INTERNA-
TIONAL CORPORATE TAXATION § 3.02 (Supp. 1981).
41 Congress had closed this loophole in response to the growing concern about foreign
investment in United States real estate. I.R.C. § 897 (1981). The Foreign Investment in Real
Property Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, 94 Stat. 2682, deems gain or loss from the
disposition of domestic real property interests to be effectively connected with the conduct of
a trade or business in the United States. The legislation achieves parity between foreign and
domestic investors in United States real estate. In enacting § 897, Congress chose to override
conflicting tax treaties, yet authorized a five year grace period befor the new legislation takes
effect. See P. PosT=WArrE, .su pra note 40, at §§ 2.28, 4.03.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-34, further restricted this loophole.
It was never Congress' intent to grant an exemption to foreign investors who rearranged their
investments after the enactment of§ 897 so as to come under a treaty which exempts the gain
from United States tax. With certain technical exceptions, treaties in force still override § 897
until January 1, 1985. H.R. REP. No. 215, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 280 (1981). See P.
PosMEWArr & M. COLLINS, INTERNATIONAL INDIVIDuAL TAXATION, §§ 3.05, 3.06 (1982).
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money effectively secured by the trust account to a dummy company in
a tax treaty nation. This allows the taxpayer to "treaty shop" and deal
through a nation that has a tax treaty with the United States which
provides an exemption from withholding on interest payments.42 E
then borrows the money from the dummy company. Funds in the tran-
saction flow from E's trust to the bank to the dummy company to
taxpayer E and a series of demand notes go back to the trust.
Transactions involving offshore tax havens are often more complex
and sophisticated than those illustrated in this section. Adroit tax plan-
ners with knowledge of bank secrecy laws can structure transactions that
enforcement agencies could never document. The problem for the en-
forcement agencies is, thus, informational. The agencies must obtain
evidence to connect taxpayers with offshore funds in legally admissable
form.
IV. INFORMATIONAL PROBLEMS
Once the problem is defined as informational, the law enforcement
agencies must address three related issues. First, the United States can-
not effectively deal with tax evasion by closing loopholes in the Internal
Revenue Code because the tax evaders in question will continue to ig-
nore the law's substantive prohibitions. Second, the enforcement agen-
cies should focus on obtaining information related to the status of such
tax evaders as opposed to recommending statutory revisions. Third, at
least in some instances, the investigators must obtain information in a
form that courts will admit as evidence in civil or criminal
proceedings. 43
A. BILATERAL ASSISTANCE: TREATIES
The simplest and most direct solution to this informational prob-
lem is to have the tax haven nations assist the United States in obtaining
the requisite information. The threshold issue is whether the United
States can negotiate treaties permitting the exchange of tax information.
The United States has employed two different types of treaty ar-
rangements to gather more information about United States taxpayers
from sources outside the United States. The primary method employed
by the United States is exchange of information provisions in double
taxation conventions." As an alternative, the United States has negoti-
42 See supra note 40.
43 Offshore Tax Haven Hearings, supra note 4, at 236-237 (statement of Prof. Harvey P.
Dale).
44 Id. at 284 (statement of H. David Rosenbloom, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for
Tax Policy).
[Vol. 73
USE OF OFFSHORE TAX HAVENS
ated mutual assistance treaties affecting criminal matters including the
coverage of tax problems.45
Double taxation conventions are designed to mitigate the effects of
two nations claiming the right to tax the same stream of income. 46 The
major substantive thrust of a double taxation convention is to limit tax-
ation by the source country by carving out the respective taxing powers
of the treaty partners. The near universal treaty provisions center on
the term "permanent establishment" as the basis for taxation.4 7 The
treaty provisions emphasize the limits on taxation by the host or source
country and therefore, the United States can never expect to be a full
scale treaty partner with tax haven nations. These nations do not tax
their residents or foreign entities. Thus, they have no incentive to reach
an agreement limiting their taxing powers.
It is theoretically possible for the United States and a tax haven to
agree on an exchange of information article in isolation from the full
blown double taxation convention.4 8 The United States has no such
treaties in existence at this time. If the United States were to negotiate
such a treaty, its terms would be similar, if not identical, to the exchange
of information provisions in double taxation conventions.
Each one of the United States bilateral conventions for the avoid-
ance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to
taxes on income or estates contains a provision requiring an exchange of
tax information. The wording of these provisions is generally standard-
ized. The two nations agree to exchange information which "authorities
have in proper order at their disposal [and] as is necessary for carrying
out provisions of the present Convention or for the prevention of fraud
or the administration of statutory provisions against legal avoidance in
relation to the taxes which are the subject of this present Convention." 49
45 The United States has only four such treaties in force at this time. See, e.g., Treaty with
Switzerland on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United States-Switzer-
land, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302.
46 For a general discussion of these conventions and their ramifications, see P.
POSTLEWAITE & M. COLLINS, INTERNATIONAL INDIvIDuAL TAXATION, chs. 8 and 9 (1982).
47 The Study of Federal Tax Law Transnational Transactions 1981-1982 191 (V. Kirby,
W. Pedrick, R. Hellawell, R. Pugh, M. Dickinson Jr., O'Bryne, W. Oliver, S. Thurmond, &J.
Yang eds. 1981). See, e.g., Convention between the United States of America and the Grand
Duchy of Luxembourg with Respect to Taxes on Income and Property, Art. III(1), December
18, 1962, United States-Luxembourg 15 U.S.T. 2355, T.I.A.S. No. 5726.
48 See infia text accompanying notes 132-34 for a discussion of the type of inducements
that are necessary to provide incentives for tax haven nations to agree to an exchange of
information treaty.
49 Convention with The Netherlands with Respect to Taxes on Income and Certain
Other Taxes, Art. XXI, April 29, 1948 United States-The Netherlands, 62 Stat. 1757, T.I.A.S.
No. 1855. But see Convention with Canada for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and Pre-
vention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Art. XIX, March 4, 1942, United
States-Canada 56 Stat. 1399, T.I.A.S. No. 983 where that particular exchange of information
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The official United States policy concerning exchange of informa-
tion articles is to request the exchange of all tax information necessary to
carry out any domestic tax laws of the contracting states.50 The point of
reference for all United States tax treaty negotiations is the United
States Model Tax Treaty,51 which defines the United States initial nego-
provision has been interpreted by the Second Circuit to have some far-reaching implications.
In United States v. A.L. Burbank & Co., Ltd., 525 F.2d 9(2d Cir. 1975) the court held that
the I.R.S. could use its I.R.C. § 7602 summons authority to obtain information from Ameri-
can based corporations which had been requested by Canadian tax authorities for purposes of
Canadian tax investigations. The court upheld the summonses even though the United
States had no interest in the investigation and there was no claim that United States income
taxes were potentially due and owing.
On September 26, 1980, the United States and Canada signed a new income tax treaty
with a more restrictive exchange of information provision. It is not yet in force. See 1 Tax
Treaties (CCH) 1317K (1980).
50 Rosenbloom and Langbein, United States Ta Treaty Policy. An Overview, 19 COL. J.
TRANSNATIONAL L. 359, 383 (1981).
51 Treasury Department's Model Income Tax Treaty, reprinted in 1 Tax Treaties (CCH)
158 (1980). Article XXVI provides,
1. The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall exchange such infor-
mation as is necessary for carrying out the provisions of this Convention or of the domes-
tic laws of the Contracting States concerning taxes covered by the Convention insofar as
the taxation thereunder is not contrary to the Convention. The exchange of information
is not restricted by Article 1 (General Scope). Any information received by a Con-
tracting State shall be treated as secret in the same manner as information obtained
under the domestic laws of that State and shall be disclosed only to persons or authorities
(including courts and administrative bodies) involved in the assessment, collection, or
administration of, the enforcement or prosecution in respect of, or the determination of
appeals in relation to the taxes covered by the Convention. Such persons or authorities
shall use the information only for such purposes. They may disclose the information in
public court proceedings or in judicial decisions.
2. In no case shall the provisions of paragraph 1 be construed so as to impose on a
Contracting State the obligation
(a) to carry out administrative measures at variance with the laws and administra-
tive practice of that or of the other Contracting State;
(b) to supply information which is not obtainable under the laws or in the normal
course of the administration of that or of the other Contracting State;
(c) to supply information which would disclose any trade, business, industrial,
commercial, or professional secret or trade process, or information the disclosure of
which would be contrary to public policy (order public).
3. If information is requested by a Contracting State in accordance with this Arti-
cle, the other Contracting State shall obtain the information to which the request relates
in the same manner and to the same extent as if the tax of the first-mentioned State were
the tax of that other State and were being imposed by that other State. If specifically
requested by the competent authority of a Contracting State, the competent authority of
the other Contracting State shall provide information under this Article in the form of
depositions of witnesses and authenticated copies of unedited original documents (in-
cluding books, papers, statements, records, accounts, and writings), to the same extent
such depositions and documents can be obtained under the laws and administrative
practices of that other State with respect to its own taxes.
4. Each of the Contracting States shall endeavor to collect on behalf of the other
Contracting State such amounts as may be necessary to ensure that relief granted by the
Convention from taxation imposed by that other State does not enure to the benefit of
persons not entitled thereto.
5. Paragraph 4 of this Article shall not impose upon either of the Contracting
States the obligation to carry out administrative measures which are of a different nature
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tiating position and reflects basic policy objectives. Although the Treas-
ury patterned the model tax convention after the Model Tax Treaty of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, [herein-
after cited as the O.E.C.D.],5 2 the United States model provision on in-
formation exchange is much broader than that of the O.E.C.D. The
Treasury Model Treaty expressly requires officials of a state from which
information is requested to take depositions and to provide authenti-
cated copies of unedited original documents to the extent they can ob-
tain such depositions and documents under the laws and administrative
practices of that state.53 The goal of the Treasury Model Treaty is to
produce information in a form that the treaty partners can use in civil or
criminal cases.54
In practice, informational exchange provisions typically include ex-
press limitations on the obligations of the parties to gather or exchange
information. Ordinarily the states agree to gather only information that
is available under the laws of the requested state.55 The information
exchanges are also normally limited by standard international law re-
strictions on a state's responsibility to place its public administrative ma-
chinery at the service of a sister state.56
The second type of agreement providing for an exchange of infor-
mation is a mutual assistance treaty. Under the terms of such a com-
pact, the contracting parties agree to lend their administrative
machinery to each other in connection with specified types of investiga-
tions. The treaty sets forth a general obligation to furnish assistance and
defines the most important acts included in that concept. This type of
from those used in the collection of its own taxes, or which would be contrary to its
sovereignty, security, or public policy.
6. For the purposes of this Article, the Convention shall apply, notwithstanding
the provisions of Article 2 (Taxes Covered), to taxes of every kind imposed by a Con-
tracting State.
52 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Model Convention for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, reprinted in 1
Tax Treaties (CCH) 151 (1980).
53 Treasury Department's Model Income Tax Treaty, supra note 51, at Art. XXVI(3).
54 The O.E.C.D., on the other hand, requires the exchange of information only "as is
necessary for the carrying out of this Convention." See supra note 52, at Art. XIII(l).
55 This limitation renders an exchange of information agreement with a tax haven juris-
diction useless because the haverr's banking secrecy laws ensure the unavailability of the re-
quested information.
56 Under these limitations of a state's responsibility to furnish information, a requested
state is normally not required: (1) to carry out administrative measure at variance with its
laws and administrative practice or those of the requesting state; (2) to supply information
not obtainable under the laws or in the normal course of the administration of either state;
(3) to supply information which would disclose any trade, business, industrial, commercial,
or professional secret or trade process, or any information the disclosure of which would be
contrary to public policy. Offihore Tax Haven Hearings, sufira note 4, at 285. See United States
v. A.L. Burbank & Co., Ltd., supra note 49, for an expansive use of administrative machinery.
19821
COMMENTS
treaty is broadly conceived to overcome the obstacles that preclude ac-
cess to information obtainable only by official action on foreign soil.
Customary international law does not require one state to give aid to
another in connection with the first state's administrative or criminal
investigations or proceedings.5 7 Municipal law frequently will prohibit
measures by a foreign state to collect information because the state views
such measures as an infringement of sovereignty if taken in the absence
of a treaty or other official sanction.58
The United States has only four mutual assistance treaties in force
at this time.5 9 Switzerland agreed to the first such compact, largely in
response to political pressures exerted by the United States. Switzerland
entered into the agreeihent in part because of its sensitivity to United
States public opinion regarding Swiss Bank secrecy.60 Many other na-
tions are also sensitive to United States public opinion. The agreements
with Columbia, 6 1 The Netherlands, 62 and Turkey63 began as agree-
ments to aid American investigations of the activities of Lockheed Air-
craft and McDonnell Douglas Corporations. This sensitivity might
continue to form the basis for negotiations.
The effectiveness of these treaties, however, to make available tax
and fiscal information is uncertain. The United States has had limited
experience with mutual assistance treaties. Only the treaty with Swit-
zerland has been in force long enough to enable an analysis of its effec-
tiveness. Interpretive problems have prevented the United States from
obtaining tax information under the auspices of this treaty.64 The senate
advised and consented to the other treaties in December, 1981, and thus,
they have not yet been implemented.
Some bank secrecy jurisdictions, however, might benefit from a mu-
tual assistance treaty with the United States. Even if the offshore tax
5' Ojiho Tax Haven Hearings, supra note 4, at 286 (statement of H. David Rosenbloom,
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy).
58 Id.
59 See, e.g., Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Treaty with Switzerland, May 25,
1973, United States-Switzerland 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302.
60 Offshore Tax Haven Hearings, supra note 4, at 291 (statement of H. David Rosenbloom,
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy).
61 Procedures for Mutual Assistance in the Administration of Justice in Connection with
the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Matter, April 22, 1976, United States-Columbia, 27
U.S.T. 1059, T.I.A.S. No. 8244.
62 Agreement on Procedures for Mutual Assistance Between the United States Depart-
ment of Justice and the Ministry of Justice of the Kingdom of The Netherlands in Connec-
tion with Matters Relating to the McDonnell Douglas Corporation, March 21, 1979, United
States-Netherlands, 30 U.S.T. 2501, T.I.A.S. No. 9348.
63 Agreement on Procedures for Mutual Assistance in the Administration of Justice in
Connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and the McDonnell Douglas Corpora-
tion Matters, July 8, 1976, United States-Turkey, 27 U.S.T. 3419, T.I.A.S. No. 8371.
64 e in/ia text accompanying notes 137-42.
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haven has little interest in obtaining tax information, it may desire an
exchange of information concerning other criminal matters. In certain
circumstances, the United States could grant concessions in nontax ar-
eas as an inducement to some form of information exchange.65 In pro-
ceeding with a program to promote mutual assistance treaties, the
United States should develop an initial negotiating position which re-
flects its basic tax and enforcement policy concerns.66
Information exchange agreements are probably a better solution to
the problem of criminal tax evasion than mutual assistance treaties.
Most nations are reluctant to apply mutual assistance treaties to tax
matters; historically they have viewed such treaties as adjuncts to extra-
dition treaties which do not cover fiscal or tax violations.67 Further-
more, the information exchange agreement is a better means of
obtaining sought-after information because the information exchange
takes place directly between tax authorities, whereas under mutual
assistance treaties the exchange takes place directly between regular law
enforcement officials. The information exchange provision in double
taxation conventions also creates a familiarity between tax enforcement
officials which may constitute a substantial benefit to practical informa-
tion exchange.66
Regardless of which kind of treaty mechanism the United States
negotiates with offshore tax havens, bilateral assistance remains the sim-
plest and most efficient solution to the problem of international criminal
tax evasion. Bilateral negotiations must focus on the inducements that
will encourage tax havens to enter into treaties with the United States.
As a practical matter, there might not be any inducements sufficient to
promote exchange of information treaties with tax havens.69 The
United States, therefore, must continue to explore unilateral solutions,
including legislation and increased investigation of offshore transactions.
B. SELF-HELP
1. Bank Secre, Act
In the late 1960's, Congress held hearings to explore the possibilities
65 Ohore Tax Haven Hearings, supra note 4, at 292. See infra text accompanying notes 132-
34.
66 The United States had already established a starting negotiation position in the area of
double taxation conventions. See sura note 51 and accompanying text. The United States is
quite familiar with the problems encountered in negotiating double taxation conventions and
thus, can better deal withqthem. Interagency coordination among the State, Justice and
Treasury Departments will be necessary to develop the mutual assistance treaty as a func-
tional tool in the solution of the problems of offshore tax havens.
67 Ofihore Ta Haven Hearings, supra note 4, at 291-92.
68 1d.
69 &ee infta text accompanying notes 132-34.
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of unilateral measures to curb the use of secret foreign bank accounts for
illegal purposes. 70 Congress enacted the Bank Secrecy Act after the
hearings disclosed that the use of secret foreign accounts for illegal pur-
poses created grave regulatory and tax enforcement problems. 71 Con-
gress determined that records and reports of domestic transactions of
currency and of the export of money "have a high degree of usefulness
in criminal, tax, and regulatory investigations and proceedings."
72
Title I of the Act deals with financial recordkeeping; it delegates
broad authority to the Secretary of the Treasury to "prescribe regula-
tions to carry out the purposes of this section."' 73 Subpart C of the Regu-
lations requires every financial institution to keep records concerning
any advice, request, 6r instruction received regarding a transaction
which results in the transfer of funds, currency, other monetary instru-
ments, checks, investment securities, or credit of greater than $10,000 to
a person, account, or place outside the United States. 74 In addition,
banks must ascertain their account holders' identities and record their
taxpayer identification numbers. 75 Banks must maintain records for a
period of five years and must make their records available for inspection
at all times. 76 Violations may subject the recordkeeper to civil or crimi-
nal penalties. 77
Congress enacted Title I because of the trend among large banks to
discontinue their practice of photocopying checks and documents of
funds transfers. Robert M. MorganthAu, former United States Attorney
for the Southern District of New York, testified that in numerous cases,
investigations "were frustrated by the premature destruction of bank
documents or the failure to make copies Of them."1
78
Title II and subpart B of the Regulations specify the reporting re-
quirements. The legislative history indicates that the purpose of Title II
is to accumulate information on persons transferring large amounts of
currency without the use of legal proess. As the House Committee on
70 See H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 1, repinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4394, for the reports from this hearing.
71 Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1301 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730(d), 1829(b), 31
U.S.C. §§ 1051-122, 15 U.S.C. § 78(g) (1976)). Title II is referred to as the "Currency and
Foreign Transactions Reporting Act."
72 Bank Secrecy Act § 101, 31 U.S.C. § 1051 (1976).
73 Id.
74 31 C.F.R. § 103.33(b) (1981).
75 31 C.F.R. § 103.34(a)(1) (1981).
76 31 C.F.R. § 103.32 (1981).
77 Bank Secrecy Act § 125, 126, 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.47, 103.49 (1981).
78 Hearings on HR. 15073 Hearings before the House Committee on Banking and Curreng, 91st
Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 92 (1970) (testimony of Robert Morganthau, United States District
Attorney, S.D.N.Y.).
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Banking and Currency concluded: "Criminals deal in money-cash or
its equivalent. The deposit and withdrawal of large amounts of cur-
rency or its equivalent (monetary instruments) under unusual circum-
stances may betray a criminal activity. '79
The Secretary of the Treasury is delegated broad powers to pro-
mulgate regulations to carry out the purposes of the Act. 80 These regu-
lations require the filing of three different types of reports:
(1) Every financial institution must "file a report of each deposit,
withdrawal, exchange of currency or other payment or transfer, by,
through, or to such financial institution, which involves a transaction in
currency of more than $10,000."81 The regulations provide an exemp-
tion for transactions between domestic banks.82
(2) Every person "who physically transports, mails or ships . . .
currency or other monetary instruments in an aggregate amount exceed-
ing $5,000. . . from the United States to, or into the United States from
any place outside the United States" must file a report with Customs. 83
(3) Every purpose who is "subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States. . . and who has a financial interest in, or significant authority
over, a bank, securities, or other financial account in a foreign country
must report such relation for each year in which such relationship
exists."84
The putative goal of this legislation is to combat the use of secret
foreign bank accounts to hide legal or illegal income for tax evasion and
other criminal purposes. The Bank Secrecy Act and implementing
Treasury Regulations render the failure to report the legal or beneficial
ownership of a foreign bank account a crime.85
79 H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWs 4394, 4396.
'80 Bank of Secrecy Act § 204. The constitutionality of the authority conferred upon the
Secretary of the Treasury was challenged and upheld in California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz,
416 U.S. 21 (1974). The Court held that the recordkeeping requirements imposed by the
Regulations did not deprive the banks of their fifth amendment due process rights. The
Court did not directly address the privacy issue. Many student commentators, however, in
analyzing this case focused upon the effects of the Bank Secrecy Act on the right of privacy.
See, e.g., Note, Government Access to Bank Records, 83 YALE LJ. 1439 (1974).
81 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a) (1981). Reported on I.R.S. form 4789.
82 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(b) (1981).
83 31 C.F.R. § 103.23(a) (1981). Reported on Customs form 4790.
84 31 C.F.R. § 103.24 (1981). Reported on I.R.S. forms 1040,4683 and Treasury form 90-
22.
•85 Bank Secrecy Act § 126, 31 C.F.R. § 103.49 (1981). Even without this provision, fail-
ure'to report an ownership interest in a foreign bank account constitutes a crime under 18
U.S.C. § 1001 (1976). This section provides that any person who knowingly and wilfully
falsifies any document within the jurisdiction of any agency of the United States may be fined
up to $10,000 and imprisoned for up to five years. A taxpayer must answer a question con-
cerning ownership of foreign bank accounts on form 1040 of his tax return.
1982]
COMMENTS
The efficacy of the Bank Secrecy Act in preventing and combatting
tax evasion is uncertain. Many Internal Revenue Service officials con-
tend that the information in the reports generated by the Act do not
help them to detect tax evasion.8 6 The General Accounting Office evalu-
ation of the Bank Secrecy Act also criticized the efficacy of the reporting
requirements.8 7 The required reports have not been widely used and,
therefore, their potential utility as an investigative tool is unknown. The
General Accounting Office questioned law enforcement and regulatory
officials about their use of these reports. In only one-third of the offices
that the General Accounting Office visited were the reports used at all.
Even when they were used, these reports served only as secondary inves-
tigative tools. Officials used the reports to identify investigative targets,
to determine the extent and location of financial assets and to establish
secondary criminal violations.8 8
Moreover, since financial institutions must file reports for every
transaction in excess of $10,000,89 the amount of data gathering and
processing is voluminous. Estimates suggest that financial institutions
microfilm over thirty billion photocopies each year at an aggregate cost
in the hundreds of millions of dollars.90 Both financial institutions and
government agencies must file, examine and store reports thus necessi-
tating an elaborate and expensive bureaucracy on the part of both the
government and the financial institutions. One commentator has sug-
gested that the "sheer size of the 'haystack' might very well make the
discovery of incriminating 'needles' costly beyond proportion to any
value they might have." 9'
Another reason why the Act is ineffective is because the same per-
sons who are willing to use secret foreign bank accounts to perpetrate
tax evasion schemes do not have any qualms about violating the report-
ing requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act. Those wishing to circumvent
the law can easily do so by sending the money both in and out of the
United States through the use of phony names. Most tax evasion
schemes involve the use of financial intermediaries subject to the record-
ing and reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act. Notwithstand-
86 GENERAL AccouNTING OFFICE, Better Use of Currency and Foreign Account Reports
by Treasury and IRS Needed for Law Enforcement Purposes 5 (1979).
87 GENERAL AccouNTING OFFICE, Bank Secrecy Act Reporting Requirements Have Not
Yet Met Expectations, Suggesting Need for Amendment 6, 7, 11 (1981).
88 Id.
89 31 C.F.R. § 103.2 2 (a) (1980).
90 Hearings on H.R. 15073, Hearings Before the House Committee on Banking and Currencyp, 91st
Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 320 (1970) (statement of Carl W. Desch, Senior Vice-President, First
National City Bank, New York).
91 Comment, Swiss Banks and Their American Clients: A Fading Romance, 3 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 37, 56-57 (1972).
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ing this fact, the veil of secrecy provided by offshore tax havens which
prevents enforcement agencies from connecting taxpayers to offshore
funds is still effective enough to conceal the true nature of such business
transactions. 92 As Justice Douglas noted in his dissent in Calornia Bank-
ers Association v. Schultz, the reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy
Act are a "sledge-hammer approach to a problem that only a delicate
scalpel can manage. '93
2. Operation Tradewinds and Project Havens
The Internal Revenue Service has conducted intelligence opera-
tions on the use of offshore banking and investments. From 1965
through 1975, the Intelligence Division of the Jacksonville, Florida dis-
trict of the I.R.S. conducted two related investigations concerning the
use of Caribbean offshore tax havens. The primary information gather-
ing project and the related spin-off project were known as Operation
Tradewinds 'and Project Havens, respectively. The purpose of these
projects was to gather intelligence in the Caribbean concerning Ameri-
can investments, particularly those related to organized criminal
activity.94
In the early 1960's, a number of investigations involving organized
crime figures indicated that certain taxpayers conducted financial trans-
actions in the Bahamas in order to evade tax liability. Accordingly, the
Intelligence Division made trips to the Bahamas to establish contacts
with Bahamian officials and others in order to secure financial informa-
tion on such individuals. 95 The Intelligence Division determined that
many Americans formed Bahamian corporations and trusts in order to
evade tax liabilities. Special agents secured the requisite financial infor-
mation until the Bahamian government enacted its bank secrecy legisla-
tion in October, 1965.96 The Act made it a crime "for any person to
disclose . . . any information relating to the affairs of a bank or of its
customers which [the person] acquired in the performance of his duties
or the exercise of his official functions. '97
The Service's internal machinery then established administrative
guidelines which covered the use of paid informants and the receipt of
92 Meyer, Swis Banking Serey and Its Legal Implications in the United States, 14 N.E. L. REv.
18, 75 (1978).
93 416 U.S. at 85 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
94 Oversight Hearings into the Operations of the IAS (Operation Tradewinds, Project Haven, and
Narcotics Trajckers Tax Program): Hearings before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer and Mone-
tay Aqjirs ofthe House Committee on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 137 (1975) (testi-
mony of Richard E. Jaffe, Special Agent, I.R.S.) [hereinafter cited as Tradewinds Hearings].
95 Id. at 1301.
96 Id.; Bank and Trust Co. Regulation Act of 1965 (No. 64 of 1965). See supra note 24.
97 Id. at § 10(2); Tradewinds Hearings, supra note 94, at 1301.
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bank information from Bahamian banks.98 These guidelines in effect
invited the Intelligence Division to violate the Bahamian bank secrecy
law. Additionally, overzealous agents on several occasions failed to fol-
low the guidelines established for securing bank information.99 With
the information provided by the informants as a starting point, the
I.R.S. recommended deficiencies of over $52,000,000 at a cost to the
Service of a little more than $1,500,000.100 The Service suspended the
investigations in 1975 after it acknowledged that it had obtained the
information in violation of federal law. 10 1
Operation Tradewinds and Project Havens did result in some in-
dictments and convictions. The government obtained the critical evi-
dence that was needed to connect many American taxpayers to their
offshore funds in a January, 1973 seizure which later became known as.
the "briefcase caper."' 1 2 An informant of the I.R.S. stole a Bahamian
banker's briefcase and photocopied its contents while a woman em-
ployee of the informant was "entertaining" the banker. 0 3
Among the over 400 documents obtained in the "briefcase caper"
was a document indicating that Jack Payner held a bank account with
the Castle Bank in the Bahamas. After confirming the Service's suspi-
cion of the Castle Bank's connection with a Florida bank, the I.R.S.
subpoenaed the Florida bank and required it to produce all documents
related to its dealings with the Castle Bank.10 4 The subpoenas resulted
in the discovery of a loan agreement which pledged money from a Cas-
tle Bank account in the name of Jack Payner, as security for a $100,000
loan by Castle Bank to Conel Development Inc.1°5
Jack Payner was indicted on September 14, 1976, for knowingly
and willfully making a false statement in a matter within the jurisdic-
tion of an agency of the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001.106 He was charged with falsely stating on his 1972 tax return
98 Service agents could make contacts in the Bahamas subject to the following restrictions:
American citizens who were to act as intermediaries could receive the information obtained
from bank employees in the Bahamas only in the United States; the I.R.S. could only use the
information as a lead; the Service had to designate an agent other than the normal agent used
for liason purposes in the Bahamas as the person to receive such information. Tradetwinds
Hearngs, supra note 94, at 1303.
99 Id. at 1313.
100 Id. at 46, 47, 49.
101 Id. at 123 (statement of Donald C. Alexander, Commissioner of Internal Revenue).
The suspension of these projects generated allegations that Commissioner Alexander was per-
sonally involved with some of the investigatees. It was further alleged that Alexander person-
ally ordered the suspension. See id. at 1268.
102 Id. at 57.
103 United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113 (N.D. Ohio 1977), rev'd, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
104 Id. at 122.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 117.
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that he did not have a foreign bank account when in fact he had an
account with the Castle Bank of over $100,000.107
Payner waived his right to a jury trial and moved to suppress the
evidence relating to the loan guarantee agreement. With the consent of
the parties, the district court consolidated the motion to suppress with a
trial on the merits. 10 8 On the basis of all evidence, the court found
Payner guilty as charged. 10 9 The court also found that the United
States acting through its agents, knowingly and willfully participated in
the unlawful seizure of the briefcase. 1' 0 The trial court logically drew
the nexus between the loan guarantee agreement and the "briefcase ca-
per" and suppressed the evidence. Although the court held that the
search did not impinge on Payner's fourth amendment rights, it did
hold that the fifth amendment's due process clause and the inherent
supervisory power of the federal courts required it to exclude evidence
"which exhibits [the Government's] knowing and purposeful bad faith
hostili to any person's fundamental constitutional rights."'
The Sixth Circuit affirmed in a brief order endorsing the trial
courts use of its supervisory power, 1 2 but the Supreme Court reversed in
a six to three decision." 13 The Court first held that the district court was
correct in finding that Payner lacked standing under the fourth amend-
ment to invoke the exclusionary rule to suppress the documents illegally
seized.1 4 The established rule concerning standing to invoke the exclu-
sionary rule is that evidence may not be excluded unless a court finds
that an unlawful search or seizure violated the defendant's own constitu-
tional rights. 15 The government violates an individual's fourth amend-
ment rights only when its conduct invades the individual's legitimate
107 Id. at 117-18. Payner failed to correctly answer the question on Form 1040 of his tax
return relating to foreign bank accounts which reads as follows: "Did you, at any time during
the taxable year, have any interest or signature over a bank, securities or other financial
account in a foreign country (except in a U.S. military banking facility operated by a U.S.
financial institution)?" Id. at 118 n. 1.
108 United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. at 729.
109 Id.
11o 434 F. Supp. at 120. The woman employee of the I.R.S. informant never testified in
the Payner case, even though her testimony would have helped to resolve the factual issue of
the propriety of the Government's conduct. The trial court concluded that it was peculiarly
within the power of the United States to produce her as a witness because she worked for its
agent and was totally unknown to the defendant. The court inferred her from absence that
her testimony would be unfavorable to the Government in that it would further delineate the
improprieties of the "briefcase caper." Id. at 119 n.22.
111 Id. at 129. (Emphasis in original).
112 590 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1979).
113 447 U.S. at 727, 737.
114 Id. at 731-32.
115 Id. at 731 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)).
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expectation of privacy rather than that of a third party.1 16 Since the
rights infringed upon were those of the Castle Bank and its banker,
Payner had no standing to assert the exclusionary rule.
The Supreme Court applied analogous reasoning to the issue of the
federal court's supervisory power and included the evidence. The Court
held that the district court's approach upset the careful balance of inter-
ests embodied in the Supreme Court's fourth amendment decisions.
117
In considering the application of the exclusionary rule, the Court bal-
ances the government's blatantly illegal actions against the resulting
harm from the indiscriminate application of the exclusionary rule. Jus-
tice Powell, writing for the majority, weighed these same factors in con-
sidering whether to invoke the supervisory power to suppress illegally
seized evidence."" Thus the Court held "that the interest in deterring
illegal searches does not justify the exclusion of tainted evidence at the
instance of the party who was not the victim of the challenged
practices." 119
From the perspective of the tax enforcement authorities,
Tradewinds and Havens are not functional precedents for future investi-
gations because of the unusual manner in which the evidence was ob-
tained. Simply as a matter of policy, the Service cannot actively
participate in illegal activities as a means of enforcing the tax laws, even
though the evidence might be admissable in court. The I.R.S. sus-
pended these investigations because it considered Operation
Tradewinds and Project Havens an undue allocation of Service re-
sources to organized criminal activity. 120 As Commissioner Alexander
said in his testimony before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer
and Monetary Affairs, "such activity fails to serve the ends of tax ad-
ministration and enforcement."''
116 Id. at 731 (citing 439 U.S. at 143).
117 Id. at 733. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973), Combs v. United
States, 408 U.S. 224 (1972).
118 447 U.S. at 734-35. Powell emphasized that the Court never held that the supervisory
power authorized suppression of illegally obtained evidence. Id. at 735 n.7. The supervisory
power permits courts to supervise "the administration of criminal justice." Id. at 735. (citing
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943)). The Court has applied the supervisory
power in a restrained manner. "[A]ny apparent limitation upon the process of discovering
truth in a federal trial ought to be imposed only upon the basis of considerations which
outweigh the general need for untrammeled disclosure of competent and relevant evidence in
a court of justice." Id. at 735 (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960)).
119 Id. at 735. The Court dismissed the due process issue in a footnote because no pro-
tected right of the defendant was involved. Id. at 737 n.9. See Hampton v. United States, 425
U.S. 484, 490 (1976).
120 See Tradewinds Hearingx, supra note 94, at 121.
121 Id. at 121 (statement of Donald C. Aleander, Commissioner of Internal Revenue).
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V. SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM
Substantive legislative revision will not solve or deter international
criminal tax evasion. The simple prohibition of section 7201 that ren-
ders any willful act or attempt to evade any tax a felony, sufficiently
addresses all criminal tax evasion issues. Viable options do exist, how-
ever, in the areas of audit investigation and information exchange.
A. INFORMATION EXCHANGES
During the Oversight Subcommittee Hearings on offshore tax
havens, Marshall J. Langer, a Miami tax attorney, recognized the im-
portance of information exchange and offered a concrete proposal to
deal with illegal tax evasion by Americans in offshore tax centers.122
Recognizing that virtually all of the United States' double taxation con-
ventions in force contain an exchange of information provision, Langer
suggested inviting all other nations, with which the United States does
not already have an existing tax treaty in force, to sign an information
exchange agreement with the United States. The United States would
then classify each nation in the world according to whether or not it has
an information exchange agreement, either in a bilateral tax convention
or on its own with the United States. Langer would have the United
States impose economic sanctions on every nation refusing to enter into
these agreements. He recommends amending the Internal Revenue
Code to restrict the benefits that are now freely given to citizens of all
foreign nations, 23 to foreign citizens of those nations with which the
United States has an information exchange agreement. This proposal
introduces an extrinsic inducement into the treaty bargaining process.
Either a nation would agree to enter into an information exchange
treaty or the United States would deny to its residents certain tax
benefits.
The United States would tax citizens of countries refusing to enter
into such agreements by withholding at the source on all income and
gains from United States sources without exception, including interest
on bank deposits, treasury bills and capital gains. Furthermore,
Langer's proposal would no longer permit tax deferrals by United States
shareholders of controlled foreign corporations that are incorporated in
nations with which the United States does not have an information ex-
change accord.' 24
The goal of this proposal is to divide the world into two parts. For-
eign nations of countries with information exchange agreements would
122 0,ffshore Tax Haven Hearings, supra note 4, at 228 (statement of Marshall J. Langer).
123 See, e.g., supra note 15.
124 O fhore Tax Haven Hearings, supra note 4, at 228.
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continue to enjoy all of the tax benefits they currently possess and for-
eign persons residing in nations without those treaties would lose their
right to enjoy these benefits. Offshore tax havens would have two op-
tions-either they could keep their bona fide offshore business or they
could keep their illegitimate business. A tax haven could not success-
fully keep both. With an information exchange agreement in force, off-
shore tax havens would lose their tax evasion business because bank
secrecy laws would not longer protect taxpayers. On the other hand, if
the tax haven refuses to enter into such an agreement, then it would
probably lose most of its legitimate American financial business because
the United States would now deny various American tax benefits to the
businesses operating out of the tax haven. 125
The Service would have to exercise a certain amount of care to
prevent persons residing in nations which refuse to agree to an exchange
of information treaty from indirectly obtaining unintended benefits. 126
To mitigate circumvention of the intended effects of Langer's proposal,
Congress would have to require full withholding at the statutory thirty
percent rate' 27 for all domestic-source income paid to foreign persons
notwithstanding the fact that a lower tax-treaty rate exists. 128 The Serv-
ice would then monitor claims for refunds of excess withholdings and
restrict refunds to intended beneficiaries only.
Langer's proposal would not totally eliminate international crimi-
nal tax evasion, but he believes that his plan would reduce evasion sub-
stantially for a number of reasons. First, the plan should make tax
evasion more costly. With more information exchange agreements in
force, a prospective evader would need many tiers of entities in different
nations to disguise a transaction. 29 More complete documentation
would enable the Service to piece together virtually any business trans-
action. Second, the I.R.S. could more easily monitor transactions in the
limited number of tax havens that did not sign information exchange
agreements than in all of the offshore financial centers that exist to-
day. 130 This of course assumes that the United States could induce
125 Id. at 228-29.
126 A citizen of a nation without an agreement could circumvent Langer's plan through
the use of a three-step transaction instead of a two-step transaction. The transaction would
run from the nation without the agreement to a nation with an agreement to the United
States.
127 I.R.C. §§ 1441 (individuals), 1442 (corporations) (1981).
128 Many treaties provide for reduced or zero rates of withholding on certain types of in-
come. See, e.g., Convention between the United States of America and the Federal Republic
of Germany for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, July 22,
1954, United States-Germany, Art. VI (reducing withholding rates on dividends to 15%), Art.
VII (exempting interest from withholding), 5 U.S.T. 2768, T.I.A.S. No. 3133.
129 Offhore Tax Haven Hearings, supra note 4, at 229.
130 Id.
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many offshore tax havens to enter into exchange of information agree-
ments through the threat of sanctions that Langer introduces into the
bargaining process. Third,' the mere fact that such a program exists
should deter tax evasion. The prospective tax evader cannot know
whether or when the nation in which he is conducting business will
enter into an information exchange agreement with the United States.
If an offshore tax haven enters into an agreement, transactions which
the taxpayer believed to be protected by commercial secrecy laws would
become subject to scrutiny by the Service. In this manner, a taxpayer
operating in a nation without an information exchange agreement with
the United States might eventually become vulnerable to criminal
prosecution. 131
The crux of Langer's proposal is the across the broad introduction
of sanctions involving the domestic tax consequences of overseas transac-
tions into the process of negotiating information exchange agreements.
Some general problems with this proposal render it unfeasible to imple-
ment. First, it is probably more practicable to offer such inducements
on a country-by-country basis, since the best and most appropriate bar-
gains will vary from nation to nation.132 There are a great variety of
inducements in the tax area and different inducements will attract dif-
ferent nations. The United States needs to offer to offset some of the
revenue loss to the offshore tax havens in order to induce them to enter
into these information exchange agreements. The United States might,
for example, consider granting an exemption from the foreign conven-
tion rules 33 so that certain offshore centers that sign such an agreement
131 Id.
132 Id. at 319 (statement of H. David Rosenbloom, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for
Tax Policy).
133 Congress has repeatedly enacted legislation which restricts the deductibility of expenses
related to foreign conventions. Congress enacted new section 274(h), added by section 602 of
the Tax Reform Act of 1976, PuB. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1572 (1976), for the purpose of
curtailing tax deductible vacations abroad, disguised as foreign business and professional con-
ventions. See Hefferman and Terr, Tax Planningfor Foreign Conventions After The Ta Reform Act
of 1976, 32 TAx. L. REv. 273 (1977).
Congress further restricted the deductibility of foreign convention expenses with the en-
actment of Pub. L. No. 96-608, 94 Star. 3550 (1980). Under the post-1980 rules, no expenses
are allowable for any meeting outside the North Anierican area (the United States, its posses-
sions, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Canada and Mexico) unless the taxpayer can
establish that the convention is directly related to the active conduct of his trade or business
or to an income-producing activity and that, after considering certain factors, it is "as reason-
able" for the meeting to be held outside the North American area as within it. I.R.C.
§ 274(h) (1981). Inclusion of a nation within the definition of the North American area could
generate significant amounts of convention revenue for a tax haven and thus should be 'con-
sidered as a bargaining tool in the information exchange process.
The United States and Jamaica have recently amended their double taxation convention
so that convention expenses incurred in Jamaica are now deductible for United States tax
purposes. Protocol Amending the Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
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would have the opportunity to generate additional convention revenue.
Nontax inducements might attract other tax havens. The loss of
tax benefits for their residents' United States investments would not af-
fect most tax havens because their residents have only limited invest-
ments in the United States. 134 Promises of American technology and
investment might appear more attractive to some offshore tax havens.
Second, Langer's proposal renders the tax treatment of the foreign
income of American controlled subsidiaries and the United States in-
come of foreign persons entirely dependent on whether a particular for-
eign jurisdiction had an information exchange agreement with the
United States. This could affect American multinational corporations'
ability to compete with foreign entities in foreign markets. The denial
of certain tax benefits to American subsidiaries that are incorporated in
tax havens increases the cost of doing business for the multinationals
and thus, renders them less competitive.
Third, Langer's across the board approach to extrinsic inducements
is too inflexible to become a part of the international tax policy of the
United States.135 In the negotiation of information exchange agree-
ments, the United States must make some policy sacrifices in order to
achieve some desired gains. Frequently that determination depends on
the particular circumstances. The United States must decide in individ-
ual cases as to what sacrifices are appropriate and seek the solution that
nets the greatest gain to the United States at the lowest cost in policy
terms.' 36 Langer's proposal adds inflexibility to the process of treaty
negotiations.
Finally, Langer's proposal is silent on a course of action to pursue
when an information exchange agreement does not function properly. 137
This is a current problem that the United States faces with respect to an
information exchange with Switzerland. Article XVI of the tax treaty
with Switzerland provides: "The competent authorities of the con-
tracting states shall exchange such information. . . as is necessary...
for the prevention of fraud or the like in relation to the taxes which are
the subject of the present convention."' 138 There is a distinction in Swiss
law between Steuerbetrug, tax fraud and Stererhinterziehung, tax evasion. 139
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, May 21, 1980, United States-
Jamaica Art. IV.




138 Convention between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation with respect to Taxes on Income, May 24, 1951, United
States-Switzerland Art. XVI, 2 U.S.T. 1751, 1760; T.I.A.S. No. 2316.
139 Meier, supra note 25, at 25.
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The Swiss definition of tax fraud is more restricted than the American
definition; it "encompasses only the falsification ... of documents...
intended for proving a fact of legal significance."' 140 Tax evasion, on the
other hand, encompasses the "willful failure to make a return, willful
misstatements on a return, or other deliberate efforts to obstruct proper
tax . . . collection."' 14 1 The Swiss, unlike the Americans, do not view
these latter offenses as fraud.142 The Swiss interpretation has the effect
of greatly restricting the amount of information given to the United
States. Furthermore, the Swiss Supreme Court has limited the utility of
the information received by American authorities by holding that Swit-
zerland fulfills its treaty obligations by merely furnishing an official re-
port as opposed to providing legal assistance in judicial proceedings.143
This renders the information inadmissable as evidence.
Lack of a provision in Langer's proposal for denying tax benefits to
such a country renders the proposal ineffective. The presence of such a
provision raises a host of other problems that would contravene other
policies of the United States. Other policy implications might preclude
the denial of tax benefits to a nation when the information exchange
provision is not functioning property. The denial of tax benefits to Swit-
zerland, for example, the nation through which twenty percent of all
foreign investment in the United States is routed would have serious
economic repercussions.44 In light of these costs, Langer's proposal
would not have a sufficient deterrent effect on international criminal tax
evasion to merit its implementation.
Langer's proposal is useful because it forces the United States to
focus on initiating discussions with foreign officials and not on obtaining
evidence under questionable circumstances. In a manner similar to the
Treasury Department's Model Income Tax Treaty, 145 the Assistant Sec-
retary of the Treasury for Tax Policy should define the United States'
initial bargaining position with respect to information exchange agree-
140 Oihore Tax Haven Hearings, supra note 4, at 287-88.
141 Id.
142 The stated basis for applying this interpretation of fraud to the treaty is a provision in
the convention that specifies that "any term not otherwise defined shall, unless the context
otherwise requires, have the meaning which such term has under [the nation's] own tax laws."
Convention between the United States of American and the Swiss Confederation, supra note
138, at Art. 11(2), 2 U.S.T. 1756, T.I.A.S. No. 2316. The Federal Supreme Court of Switzer-
land has confirmed that the Swiss definition of fraud is applicable to this tax convention. X
v. Federal Tax Administration, BG 96 1, 71-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCII) 9435 (1970) (Unofficial
English translation) (The names of the participants in the litigation were not released by the
Swiss Supreme Court for privacy reasons).
143 X & Y-Bank v. The Swiss Federal Tax Administration, BG 101 I 160, 76-1 U.S. Tax.
Cas. (CCH) 1 9452 (1975) (Unofficial English translation).
144 O ffshore Tax Haven Hearings, supra note 4, at 319.
145 See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
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ments, including what the United States is willing to give up in order to
promote these agreements. The United States should make concessions
and inducements to facilitate the signing of exchange of information
agreements whenever the gains derived from the agreement exceed the
costs of the concessions made.
B. FURTHER AUDIT INVESTIGATION
The second and less effective method of combatting international
criminal tax evasion involves devoting additional resources to auditing
transactions in offshore tax havens. Increased audit coverage will not
solve the problem, but it is useful because taxpayers will perceive that
they will be punished if they evade their tax liabilities.' 46 Thus, the
Service can more effectively promote voluntary compliance.
Looming forcefully in the background of this problem is the issue of
voluntary compliance. 14 7 The American tax system is based on self-as-
sessment and, consequently, voluntary participation is necessary for its
success. Tax paying entities voluntarily submit over ninety-nine percent
of the revenues collected. 148 Given its limited enforcement budget, the
Service cannot proceed against any significant percentage of tax evad-
ers, either onshore or offshore. The Service's enforcement policy is to
prosecute a few well-publicized cases each year in order to deter wrong-
doing.' 49 In order to promote compliance, the American public must
perceive the I.R.S. as a benign, as opposed to an adversary, agency. 150
Congress must place limits on the Service's enforcement budget in order
to quell public concern.' 5 ' Due to the problems and the resulting high
costs of obtaining information on American taxpayers' uses of offshore
tax havens for purposes of tax evasion, this area of investigation is not
the most cost effective for the Service to pursue. The investigation of
international criminal tax evasion is a low priority item because other
areas of investigation can generate more revenue.
The Service must employ its limited enforcement budget without
violating the law and in such a manner as to derive the maximum bene-
fit per dollar expended while still considering the problems related to
public perception. The regular use of evidence obtained under ques-
146 See general' Illegal Narcotic. Profits Hearings, supra note 5, at 477.
147 Id.
148 Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Internal Revenue Service, Annual Report of 1977,
15, 20 (1977).
149 Illegal Narcotics Profits Hearings, supra note 5, at 477.
150 Id.
151 A government that only seeks to increase revenues (i.e., a rationale profit maximizing
government) would spend an unlimited amount of money on taxpayer compliance because
each dollar expended generates approximately $4.5 in revenue. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, supra note 147, at 20, 144.
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tionable circumstances, such as Operation Tradewinds and Project
Havens, would adversely affect the public's perception of the I.R.S. It
might even have negative ramifications towards taxpayer compliance. 152
Yet, when the Service investigates fraudulent activity in tax haven na-
tions and remains within the confines of the law, it often does obtain
results. 153
The I.R.S. could minimize its public perception problem if it were
to employ only as many resources towards investigating international
criminal tax evasion as costs justify it to provide (i.e., revenues derived
from the ultimate determination of investigations exceed amounts ex-
pended on investigation). Staffing requirements would be based on as-
sessments of expected value determinations wherein the probability of a
successful investigation times the estimated amount to be realized equals
the enforcement budget related to offshore tax haven investigation. The
I.R.S. could minimize its public perception problems if it were to focus
its investigation on organized crime figures and high income taxpayers.
If Congress were to adopt cost-effective enforcement programs, it could
make an inroad on the problem of international criminal tax evasion
without any significant drain on the Federal Treasury. Furthermore,
such a program would promote deterrence because of the additional re-
sources devoted to criminal investigation.
In addition to increased investigation, sounder administrative ef-
forts might render the fraudulent use of tax havens easier to detect. 154
Initially, the burden of proof to establish the tax consequences of any
transaction, including one with an entity in a tax haven jurisdiction, is
on the taxpayer.155 Service agents should deny deductions where a tax-
payer has not demonstrated an entitlement to a deduction, or where the
agent is not satisfied as to valuations or proper transfer pricing. The
I.R.S. took an initial step forward with the issuance of Revenue Ruling
80-324.t6 In that Ruling, a taxpayer, responding to an investment pro-
spectus, invested money in futures contracts in United States Govern-
ment interest-bearing certificates with a foreign investment firm. When
the taxpayer tried to deduct a loss on the transaction, the Service denied
the deduction because the investment firm's records were not available
to the Service for examination. Despite the taxpayer's offer to substanti-
ate his loss and to present the investment prospectus, cancelled checks,
152 Tradewinds Hearings, supra note 94, at 123 (statement of Donald C. Alexander, Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue).
153 See e.g., United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 947
(1966), in which promoters used four "liechtenstein" trusts holding Swiss bank accounts to
sell fraudulently priced stock.
154 TAX HAVENS, supra note 7, at 128.
155 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
156 Rev. Rul. 80-324, 1980-2 C.B. 340.
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and a confirmation statement from the investment firm, the Service re-
fused to allow the deduction. 57 Even without increased investigation
the Service should continue to assume that aggressive attitude in analyz-
ing all tax haven transactions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The magnitude of the use of offshore tax havens for tax evasion
purposes, coupled with the inability of American agencies to deter such
use and the international trade implications of the situation, have made
the tax haven issue a controversial one. This concern is amplified by the
suspicion that much of the funds are not simply sequestered for tax eva-
sion purposes, but rather are the product of corporate and organized
crime that are so offensive to the public morals. 158 It is difficult to define
an appropriate solution to the problem when commercial secrecy laws
prevent a definition of its scope.
The two solutions offered in this comment, exchange of information
agreements and cost-effective audit investigations serve to place the
problem of international criminal tax evasion in its proper perspective.
The focus of the problem is informational, not substantive. Neither of
these solutions would put an end to international tax evasion, for it is
too widespread. The proposed solutions should, however, make an in-
road on the problem. The ultimate importance of this problem remains
its effect on voluntary taxpayer compliance. Taxpayers submit ninety-
nine percent of all tax revenues voluntarily. 59 As the public perceives
widespread evasion going unpunished, it becomes more reluctant to pay
compliantly. If a large enough percentage of the public refuses to com-
ply with the tax laws, then the entire tax system falls apart.
DOUGLAS J. WORKMAN
157 Id. at 340-41.
158 Illegal Narcotics Profits Hearings, supra note 5, at 476.
159 e supra notes 146-52 and accompanying text.
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